

~~TOP SECRET~~

JS



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-307-67

- 1 JUN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Draft Memorandum for the President on Future Actions in Vietnam (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:

a. JCSM-218-67, dated 20 April 1967, subject: "Force Requirements - Southeast Asia FY 1968 (U)"; JCSM-286-67, dated 20 May 1967, subject: "Operations Against North Vietnam (U)"; and JCSM-288-67, dated 20 May 1967, subject: "Worldwide US Military Posture (U)."

b. Draft memorandum for the President (DPM), dated 19 May 1967, subject: "Future Actions in Vietnam," which was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment.

2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the DPM. The DPM addresses two basic courses of action: Course A - adds a minimum of 200,000 men to the Southeast Asia commitment and includes major ground operations and intensified air and naval actions outside South Vietnam, especially against North Vietnam; Course B - limits force increases to no more than 30,000 men, avoids extending the ground conflict beyond the borders of South Vietnam, and concentrates the bombing on the infiltration routes south of 20°. The DPM generally implies that Course A reflects the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, Course A is an extrapolation of a number of proposals which were recommended separately but not in combination or as interpreted in the DPM. The combination force levels, deployments, and military actions of Course A do not accurately reflect the positions or recommendations of COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The positions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which provide a better basis against which to compare other alternatives, are set forth in JCSM-218-67, JCSM-286-67, and JCSM-288-67. Five major areas of concern have been identified in the DPM. They are discussed under the following headings:

OATSD(PA)DFOISR 23
TOP SECRET CONTROL

Copy No. <i>R</i>	94-F-C532
Case No. <i>94-TS-04</i>	
T.S. No. <i>11</i>	
Document No.	

~~TOP SECRET~~ CENSITIVE

17

of 22 Copies each
5 pages written "B"

*670

GROUP 1
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Declassified by Joint Staff
Date 31 Oct 94
F01A 4025

DA 13-199

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

- a. Objectives (Part I, Appendix A).
- b. Military Strategy and Operations (Other than Air/Naval Operations in the North) (Part II, Appendix A).
- c. Military Strategy for Air/Naval War in the North (Part III, Appendix A).
- d. Domestic Attitude and Predicted Reactions (Part IV, Appendix A).
- e. International Attitude and Predicted Reactions (Part V, Appendix A).

3. (b) Objectives. The preferred course of action addressed in the DPM (Course B) is not consistent with NSAM 288 or with the explicit public statements of US policy and objectives enumerated in Part I, Appendix A, and in Appendix B. The DPM would, in effect, limit US objectives to merely guaranteeing the South Vietnamese the right to determine their own future on the one hand and offsetting the effect of North Vietnam's application of force in South Vietnam on the other. The United States would remain committed to these two objectives only so long as the South Vietnamese continue to help themselves. It is also noted that the DPM contains no statement of military objectives to be achieved and that current US national, military, and political objectives are far more comprehensive and far-reaching (Appendix B). Thus:

- a. The DPM fails to appreciate the full implications for the Free World of failure to achieve a successful resolution of the conflict in Southeast Asia.
- b. Modification of present US objectives, as called for in the DPM, would undermine and no longer provide a complete rationale for our presence in South Vietnam or much of our effort over the past two years.
- c. The positions of the more than 35 nations supporting the Government of Vietnam might be rendered untenable by such drastic changes in US policy.

4. (b) Military Strategy and Operations (Other than Air/Naval Operations in the North). The DPM favors Course B with inadequate analysis of its implications for conduct of the war in Vietnam. The strategy embodied in this alternative - largely designed to "make do" with military resources currently

~~TOP SECRET~~

941103-2⁰⁰

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

approved for Southeast Asia - would not permit early termination of hostilities on terms acceptable to the United States, supporting Free World nations, and the Government of Vietnam. The force structure envisaged provides little capability for initiative action and insufficient resources to maintain momentum required for expeditious prosecution of the war. Further, this approach would result in a significant downgrading of the Revolutionary Development Program considered so essential to the realization of our goals in Vietnam. It would also result in the abandonment of the important delta region on the basis of its being primarily a problem for the Republic of Vietnam to solve without additional external assistance. (See Part II, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

5. (C) Military Strategy for Air/Naval War in the North. The DPM stresses a policy which would concentrate air operations in the North Vietnamese "funnel" south of 20°. The concept of a "funnel" is misleading, since in fact the communists are supplying their forces in South Vietnam from all sides, through the demilitarized zone, Laos, the coast, Cambodia, and the rivers in the Delta. According to the DPM, limiting the bombing to south of 20° might result in increased negotiation opportunities with Hanoi. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that such a new self-imposed restraint resulting from this major change in strategy would most likely have the opposite effect. The relative immunity granted to the LOCs and distribution system outside the Panhandle would permit: (a) a rapid recovery from the damage sustained to date; (b) an increase in movement capability; (c) a reduced requirement for total supplies in the pipeline; (d) a concentration of air defenses into the Panhandle; and (e) a release of personnel and equipment for increased efforts in infiltration of South Vietnam. Also, it would relieve the Hanoi leadership from experiencing at first hand the pressures of recent air operations which foreign observers have reported. Any possible political advantages gained by confining our interdiction campaign to the Panhandle would be offset decisively by allowing North Vietnam to continue an unobstructed importation of war materiel. Further, it is believed that such a drastic reduction in the scale of air operations against North Vietnam could only result in the strengthening of the enemy's resolve to continue the war. No doubt the reduction in scope of air operations would also be considered by many as a weakening of US determination and a North Vietnamese victory in the air war over northern North Vietnam. The combination of reduced military pressures against North Vietnam with stringent limitations of our operations in South Vietnam, as suggested in Course B, appears even more questionable conceptually. It would most likely strengthen the enemy's ultimate hope of victory and lead to a redoubling of his efforts. (See Part III, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

6. (C) Domestic Attitude and Predicted Reactions. The DPM presents an assessment of US public attitude and assumed reactions to several occurrences. Its orientation is toward the risks involved in Course A. The difficulty of making accurate judgments in the area of public response is acknowledged, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concede that their appraisal is subject to the same degree of uncertainty that is inherent in the DPM. Nevertheless, they are unable to find due cause for the degree of pessimism expressed in the DPM. The Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly believe that the American people, when well informed about the issues at stake, expect their Government to uphold its commitments. History illustrates that they will, in turn, support their Government in its necessary actions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that there is no significant sentiment for peace at any price. They believe also that despite some predictable debate a Reserve callup would be willingly accepted, and there would be no "irresistible" drive from any quarter for unnecessary escalation of the conflict. (See Part IV, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

7. (C) International Attitude and Predicted Reaction. There are several inconsistencies between the DPM and the published intelligence estimates. For example, from these intelligence estimates, there is no evidence that Hanoi is prepared to shun negotiation, regardless of the pressure brought to bear, until after the US elections. Also, it is estimated that US prestige will not decline appreciably if prompt military action is taken to bring the conflict to an early close. In the long term, US prestige would probably rise. The effect of signs of US irresolution on allies in Southeast Asia and other friendly countries threatened by communist insurgency could be most damaging to the credibility of US commitments. The DPM contains the view that there is strong likelihood of a confrontation between the United States and the CHICOMs or the USSR, as a result of intensification of air and naval operations against North Vietnam and/or a major increase in US forces in South Vietnam. Intelligence estimates do not support this contention. (See Part V, Appendix A, for additional comments.)

8. (C) Impact on US and Free World Armed Forces. Curtailment of air operations in North Vietnam (as proposed in Course B) will undoubtedly have an adverse effect upon US and Free World Armed Forces in the field.

9. (C) Most of the foregoing divergencies between the DPM and the stated policies, objectives, and concepts are individually important and are reason for concern. However, when viewed collectively, an alarming pattern emerges which suggests a

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

941103-2^o2

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

major realignment of US objectives and intentions in Southeast Asia without regard for the long-term consequences. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not aware of any decision to retract the policies and objectives which have been affirmed by responsible officials many times in recent years (Appendix B). Thus, the DPM lacks adequate foundation for further consideration.

10. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

- a. The DPM does not support current US national policy and objectives in Vietnam and should not be considered further.
- b. There is no basis for change in their views on the major issues in the DPM. These views are adequately stated in recent memorandums and reinforced herein.
- c. The US national policy and objectives should be reaffirmed.
- d. The US military objectives for Vietnam as restated in JCSM-218-67 support current US policy and objectives.
- e. Implementation of Course B would serve to prolong the conflict, reinforce Hanoi's belief in ultimate victory, and probably add greatly to the ultimate cost in US lives and treasure.

11. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

- a. The DPM NOT be forwarded to the President.
- b. The US national objective as expressed in NSAM 288 be maintained, and the national policy and objectives for Vietnam as publicly stated by US officials be reaffirmed.
- c. The military objective, concept, and strategy for the conduct of the war in Vietnam as stated in JCSM-218-67 be approved by the Secretary of Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

041103-203

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

APPENDICES A AND B
TO JCSM-307-67

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

941103-204

SENSITIVE

APPENDIX A
DPM ISSUES

1. OBJECTIVES

1. Abstracts:

- a. DPM: (1) Proposed US objective is to permit South Vietnamese to choose own future; commitment ceases if SVN ceases to help itself.
- (2) No stated military objectives.
- (3) No stated military objectives taken from the National objectives.
- b. JCS:
- (1) Support US objective as stated in NSM 208 - to guarantee independent noncommunist South Vietnam.
- (2) Military objective - make difficult RVN support of VC and cause RVN to cease direction of VC; defeat VC/NVA;

2. Specific Issues:

NOTE: Bibliography on page A-8

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPM ADDRESSES OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 US National objective - commitment	Our national objective - commitment - in Vietnam is only to see that the people of South Vietnam are permitted to determine their own future. This commitment ceases if the country ceases to help itself. Our commitment is ACT to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - expel South Vietnamese mercenaries from South Vietnam. - ensure that a particular person or group remains in power, nor that that power runs to every corner of the land. - guarantee that the self-chosen government is noncommunist. - insist that the independent South Vietnam remain separate from North Vietnam. 	NSM 208, 27 March 1966, states the US objective in South Vietnam as follows: "We seek an independent non-communist South Vietnam. The US National objective is to ensure an independent South Vietnam free of Communist subversion and able to determine its own government and national aspirations; ...".	JCS: 622-66 JCS: 218-67 JCS: 732-66
2 Military objectives in Southeast Asia	Both courses of action are developed without benefit of any statement of military objectives. The implication is that the objective for Course A with the associated force augmentation is: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to bring additional military pressure to bear on the enemy in the South while continuing to carry out our present missions not directly related to combating enemy main force units. The implication is that the objectives for the associated bombing strategy are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to retaliate and to lift the morale of the people in the South. - to add to the pressure on Hanoi to end the war. - to reduce the flow and/or to increase the cost of infiltrating men and material from north to south. The implied military objectives for Course B are to improve the negotiating environment and to stop infiltration.	Military objectives are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to make it as difficult and costly as possible for RVN to continue effective support of the VC, and to cause direct confrontation of the VC, insurgents, and forces of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Armed Forces in RVN and elsewhere. - to deter the Chinese Communists from direct intervention in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific and to be prepared to defeat such intervention if it occurs. 	JCS: 218-67
3 Political Objectives for Southeast Asia	The political objectives stated are those subsumed within the statements above regarding national objectives plus the following inferred political objectives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - initiate a "cool" drive to settle war. - lay groundwork for periodic peace probes with associated limitation of bombing. - seek possible compromise involving role in SMC for members of VC. 	See Appendix B	A-1

APPENDIX A

94 3-205

II. MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS (Other than air/naval operations in the North)

1. Abstract:

- a. DIA: The preferred strategy is essentially that of a continuation of current operations at the current level with forces currently approved. US combat troops will be removed from the Delta. Increase utilization of RVN and third-country forces in logistic support role in order to release available US forces for combat role. US efforts will be shifted from the political/RD role with the ARVN assuming a greater responsibility in this area. emphasis will be placed on seeking accommodation through reduction of pressures exerted in the North and possible future political role for the VC in the South.
- b. JCS: The strategy recommended by the JCS endorses a significant increase in military pressure with which the enemy cannot cope; maintaining momentum and initiative which will result in the destruction of the enemy main and provincial forces and their bases; providing an adequate secure environment in which RD can progress. Provides through a selected callup of reserves, forces adequate to conclude the war in Vietnam and to provide a more flexible and responsive worldwide military posture.

2. Specific issues:

SPECIFIC ISSUE	CPM ADDRESSING OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/ADS AS INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES		REFERENCES
		JCS	ADS	
1 Strategic Concept	DIA preferred strategic concept:	The JCS recommended strategic concept: a. Continue ground operations with forces currently approved. b. Make more efficient use of US manpower by: (1) Army eschewing the Delta; (2) Marines ceasing pacification; (3) ARVN performance being "jacked up"; and (4) getting more support from Koreans or other third countries. c. Emphasize responsibility for pacification and RD rests with Vietnamese. d. Initiate a "cool" drive to settle war. e. Lay groundwork for periodic peace probes with associated limitation of bombing. f. Seek possible compromise involving role in RVN for members of VC.	a. Equal degree of pressure which is beyond enemy's capability to accommodate. b. Intensity operations so as to create a secure environment in which ARVN can progress, coupled with military civic action programs in coordination with RVN programs. c. Provide adequate forces to counter increased enemy pressure to include RD and to maintain the initiative throughout Vietnam by DIA and ADS. (1) Destruction of the enemy main force. (2) Create and destroy district and provincial guerrilla forces.	JCSR 218-67
2 Reserve Callup	The DIA preferred concept of operations, COURSE A, does not include the calling up of the Reserves.	The JCS have recommended a selective callup of Reserves in order to more effectively fulfill US worldwide commitments while conducting the war in Vietnam so as to terminate it at an early date on terms favorable to US interests.		JCSR 288-67
3 Strategic Flexibility	The DIA does not consider the requirement for strategic flexibility and therefore provides no outline of course B. Other military analysts influence in the event the conflict either continues in the present pace for a protracted period or takes a turn for the worse. Further, military operations in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam are specifically excluded. "...if COURSE B is chosen, it must be made clear to political and military leaders alike that the troop limit is firm and, absent of an imminent military defeat, will not be breached -- the objective will be to make progress, even though it be slow..."	The concept recommended by the JCS not only provides the resources for a prompt repulsion of the ARVN offensive within South Vietnam but also provides forces to support ARVN's capability to assume the strategic initiative elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Specifically, the JCS has recommended the commitment of Thailand to the event that nation may be required to conduct operations in the periphery of South Vietnam. More importantly, this posture provides the US with the essential capability of strategic flexibility.		JCSR 288-67
4 Progress of RD Effort	The National Liberation Front (NLF) continues to control large parts of South Vietnam, and there is little evidence that the revolutionary development program is getting anywhere.	The fate of the RD program hinges on the degree of security which is offered to the population as well as the expanding government apparatus. Without assurance of a secure effort, and no real progress can be achieved.	Progress has been about as good as can be expected from a government which at the start was weak administratively, lacked popular support and has been deeply embroiled in a war administration. Its difficulties and barriers from competing programs progress are not negligible under these conditions.	JCSR 288-67

SPECIFIC ISSUE	TYPE ADDRESSING ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ARVN Forces	"...[T]he ARVN is not...[t]herefore...[t]o [be]...[t]ried...[t]positive...[t]and...[t]accusative...[t]not...[t]likely...[t]at all...[t]into...[t]positivism...[t]the...[t]ARVN...[t]will...[t]not...[t]perform...[t]as...[t]is...[t]imparting..."	While there is no single meaningful measure of the overall effectiveness of the ARVN, there are certain useful indicators which reflect their reported capability. A recent CGD (SA) comparative analysis conducted during the period indicated that, when weighed by relative unit strength, the ARVN battalions had 22 percent less effective than US units in terms of enemy KIA/KIA figures. While improvements will continue to improve effectiveness, the real benefits will come from the gradual day and comparative enemy and friendly successful conduct of the war and do a lasting peace in postwar Vietnam.	ON 2377-67
Characteristics of "cross-over point"	"...[W]e can play the cross-over point." cannot the military job be done without involving other allied forces. ... If the enemy can conduct his terror "from the theaters, can the military job be done even with them?"	There has been some speculation that the "cross-over point" has occurred. Placed on enemy losses, recruitment capability, infiltration rate, and fortification capability are tenuous and have been based on so many variables that a firm point cannot be established. The utility of an indicator as nebulous as "cross-over point" in the analysis of cross-over strategy is highly questionable in the near term. While the trend is encouraging, however, the veracity of the claim is important. Little significance can be attached to an apparent cross-over point in itself; relatively little significance must continue to be determined by the tasks to be accomplished and the enemy residual capability.	
7 Distinction between "big" and "crosser" wars in Vietnam	"The 'big' war" is the short between the RVN and the North Vietnamese military units by acting well" and "the 'other' war," against the VC is still not fully well."	Exception is taken with the implied distinction that two wars are being pursued in Vietnam. This implied distinction is given little weight in any discussion of effective utilization of forces. The two wars are not separate in nature, but rather are interrelated in such a manner that they can only be considered as integral and inseparable parts of one "big" war, whether they are pursued inside or outside of South Vietnam. This is logically and historically true in the field of Revolutionary Development and nationalism, and militarily true in the field of military actions to provide the requisite security for a successful program.	
Mobilization of Forces		This statement is again indicative of an effort to separate the war into "big war" and "Other war." Categories of Army and Marine combat units are directly participating in providing security at the village level, the pro-government of the American pacification efforts, training and assistance character at the sector and subsector level, etc. The increased requirement for US forces is based on recognition that a successful and timely conclusion of the war requires the application of concurrent measures and military pressure on all three echelons of enemy forces: VC/PVA main forces; provincial and district forces; and local guerrilla forces.	

III. MILITARY STRATEGY FOR AIR/NAVAL WAR IN THE NORTH

1. Abstracts:

a. DPM

b. JCS

(1) Further bombing in the North will be ineffective.

(2) A better plan would be to concentrate the bombing effort on the North Vietnamese "funnel" south of 20°C.

(1) The US should conduct a comprehensive and coordinated air/naval campaign designed to achieve well defined objectives.

(2) Concentration of bombing on the "funnel" would not be militarily advantageous.

(3) DPM represents a major change in US policy, reversing the trend of gradually increasing pressures in the North.

(4) The air/naval campaign can be controlled independently of other elements of the war, to permit most effective application of this power in order to achieve objectives.

2. Specific Issues:

BASIC ISSUES	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CADS ON INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 Relationship of Air/Naval War in the North to the Postulated Courses of Action.	Course A - Further expansion of the bombing program in the North, accompanied by buildup of forces and increased military activity on the ground, especially outside of South Vietnam. Course B - Limit force increases; confine conflict to within the borders of South Vietnam; and concentrate the bombing on the infiltration routes south of 20°.	The air/naval campaign against North Vietnam can be controlled independently of the other elements of the war. However, since all elements of the war are interdependent and complementary in their contribution toward attainment of the national objective, any reduction in the recommended force levels for South Vietnam would place an increasing premium on the pressures against North Vietnam. The direct linking of a reduced force level in South Vietnam with reduced air/naval actions outside South Vietnam, as discussed in Course B, appears doubly invalid as a concept.	CM 2377-67
2 Value of continued bombing in North Vietnam.	No major military targets remain to be struck in the North, excluding the port areas. It now appears that no combination of actions against the North short of destruction of the regime or occupation of North Vietnamese territory will physically reduce the flow of men and material below the relatively small amount needed by enemy forces to continue the war in the South, which effort can and does have severe disruptive effects, which Hanoi can and does compensate for. There continues to be no sign that the bombing has reduced Hanoi's will to resist.	The United States should conduct a comprehensive and coordinated air campaign which will: (1) bring military pressure on his internal war-supporting resources; (2) effectively impede the importation of external resources; and (3) increase interdiction of infiltration routes in North Vietnam. Such an air campaign should produce results which outweigh risks - political and military (2) provides greater effectiveness, less cost in the long run, and clearer signal to US determination to Hanoi and the rest of the world; (3) should not cause CHICOM intervention; and (4) will cause mounting pressures on North Vietnam's economy and military efforts. The most significant action yet to be accomplished that would have the greatest impact on the NVN ability to continue the war is to obstruct and reduce importation of war-supporting materials.	JCSH 288-67 JCSW 288-67 JCSM 286-67 CR 2377-67
3 Hanoi insensitivity to increased bombing pressures.	With respect to added pressure on the North, it is becoming apparent that Hanoi may already have written off actions short-of occupation or annihilation. They can and will hold out so long as a prospect of winning the attrition in the South exists.	Granted that Hanoi has taken many measures to overcome the effects of the air campaign, nevertheless, an intensified campaign should make it difficult for Hanoi to continue the war. Their propaganda against the air campaign supports this judgement. The outcome of the war, whether by political settlement or otherwise, will depend upon the cumulative effects of all US actions in Southeast Asia and the North Vietnamese willingness to continue. It is highly questionable that might be lost when they could be saved by a more focused negotiation. There is, however, no indication that the North Vietnamese regime could make any reciprocal military desecration in return for a bombing reduction.	ME 11-11-67; DIA/CIA DOC #2130 AR-4 BRM 328
4 Military Value to COMUSMACV of Shift in Bombing Effort	The latest "escalation" on infiltration can probably be accounted by concentration on the North Vietnamese "funnel" south of 20° and on the Trail in Laos. This shift, despite possible increases in anti-aircraft capability in the southwest, reduce the pilot and aircraft loss rates by more than 50 percent. The shift will, if anything, be of positive military value to General Westmoreland while killing comment out of the popular effort in the North. This shift of bombing strategy can, to military advantage, be made at any time, but the shift should be time to maximize the chances of getting Hanoi to negotiate.	In recent months the majority of our bombing effort in North Vietnam has been directed at Route 9, Route 10, and III Corps area. For example in March, about 7,000 sorties were flown in these areas as compared to about 1,500 sorties in the remaining areas of North Vietnam. A shift in bombing effort to southern North Vietnam would increase infiltration. Some increase in available sorties against North Vietnamese forces infiltrating into South Vietnam, however, would permit North Vietnam to concentrate its air defense system in the areas being attacked, thus increasing the losses in those areas. Building up in the northern part of North Vietnam and stockpiling there would be immune from attack, thereby making harassment much easier and releasing personnel and equipment for increased efforts in infiltration of South Vietnam. The additional sorties in southern part of North Vietnam might delay more infiltrating targets, but there would be more of them reaching this area to be attacked. The net result would not be of positive military value to COMUSMACV. The shift in effort will reduce air losses at least initially until the relocation of enemy air defense systems into South North Vietnam.	CR 2377-67 DIA/CIA DOC #2031 AR-4 BRM 10-1-66

BASIC ISSUES	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/JCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
5 Mining Operations in North Vietnam	<p>The program they /CINCPAC & COMUSMACV/ propose . . . would involve the virtual certainty of irresistible pressures . . . for the blockage of rail, road, and sea imports. . . for mining of the harbors against Soviet and other ships.</p> <p>Why not escalate the bombing and mine the harbors. . . meaningfully on the gamble that it would constrict the flow, and that it would bend limiting enemy action in the South, and that it would bend Hanoi? The answer is that the costs and risks of the actions must be considered. /These are cost in US lives, cost in domestic and world opinion; and most importantly, the likely Soviet, Chinese, and North Vietnamese reaction./</p>	<p>The effectiveness of LOC interdiction cannot be greatly improved until deep-water ports are closed or neutralized. It will then be worthwhile to intensify the interdiction effort against other LOC's in North Vietnam.</p> <p>Mining of NVN deep water ports will disrupt the major avenue of basic economic and military support and force the enemy to overload more vulnerable routes by rail, road, and shallow draft coastal and internal waterway shipping. Mining of internal waterways will create choke points, backup traffic and saturate alternate routes. (See also Section V, Paragraph 4, this column.)</p>	CM 2377-67 JCSM 288-67

APPENDIX A

A-5

04 11 03 -209

IV. DOMESTIC ATTITUDE AND PREDICTED REACTIONS

1. Abstracts:

- a. DPR:
 - (1) Escalation makes war more unpopular and people want out of it one way or another.
 - (2) Reserve callup will be a divisive issue.
 - (3) Force buildup will create pressure for war expansion.

- b. JCS:
 - (1) The majority of the people, although fractured with an apparently endless war, still want their country to honor its commitments.
 - (2) In the long-term, Reserve callup is more likely to be a consolidating force than a divisive one.
 - (3) The American people have learned to accommodate to selective application of military power.

2. Specific Issues:

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DRM ADDRESSAL Cf ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/CJCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
1 Disatisfaction with progress of the war	The Vietnam war is unpopular, and becoming increasingly more so as it escalates. Most Americans do not understand the war. All of them want the war ended and expect their President to end it successfully. Or else.	The vocal but minor segment of the American people who oppose US policy in Vietnam, both those in public and the vast majority of the population want to see their country fulfill its international obligations. An American characteristic is to face up to a job and get it over with as soon as possible. Accordingly, since no end can be seen to involvement in Southeast Asia, there is naturally a certain amount of frustration. However, the sense of frustration is not severe enough to support a "peace at any price" attitude.	CM 2377-67
2 Political difficulty of Reserve callup	Although increased force requirements will not lead to massive civil disobedience, a request for Congressional authority to call Reserves will lead to a divisive debate.	Callup of Reserves, a major increase in deployed forces, recommitting of heavy ships, and an increase in air/naval pressures against North Vietnam would unquestionably evoke an immediate outburst from the vocal minority that already opposes US policy. However, in the long term, these actions should have a positive effect on the majority. National pride, spirit of unity, and patriotism should be aroused when the Government further demonstrates its resolve and determination to bring the war to an acceptable termination in the shortest feasible time.	CM 2377-67
3 Pressures for stronger action outside South Vietnam	The "hawk" faction will almost certainly impose irresistible pressures for stronger action outside South Vietnam.	President Johnson and other responsible officials have stated repeatedly that we want to avoid a wider war, and both the General Public and Congress are well-conditioned to the policy of selective application of military power. Therefore, Reserve callup and/or controlled intensification of on-going actions (e.g., air/naval operations against North Vietnam) would not be expected to cause pressure for irresponsible escalation or for spreading the war beyond its current bounds. On the contrary, force buildup and graduated intensification of effort should quell the opinion held in some quarters that the United States is embarked on a "no-win" strategy. As a result, this should tend to discourage demands for higher levels of action than are militarily appropriate, or for withdrawal of US forces under less than honorable conditions.	CM 2377-67

A-5

V. INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDE AND PREDICTED REACTIONS

1. *Autofitti*

b. DPR:

- (1) Handball not negotiate until after JC elections.
- (2) Encourage China to demand a change.
- (3) Increased pressure will bring us closer to war with China and/or Russia.
- (4) DPRK might cause a severe headache.
- (5) The USSR is the most probable "peace activist".
- (6) A post hostilities rule for the DPRK should be explained.

b. JES: (1) Appropriate application of power might well bring about negotiations at any time.
 (2) Encircling Beijing will not qualitatively change US international image and position.
 (3) Neither the Soviets nor China are likely to seek a major confrontation with the US over actions the JES have recommended in SEA.
 (4) Same as (3).
 (5) The US might become a "peace slob" but US should not place primary reliance on this scheme.
 (6) The Vietnamese, as such, should not be accommodated within the GVN, but only integrated into national life as rehabilitated by citizens.

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPA ADDRESSES OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE JCS/DCS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	
		REFERENCES	DATE 10-12-65 SHEE 10-11-67 ON 2377-67 SHEE 10-11-67
1 Incentive for Hanoi to negotiate	Hanoi probably has decided not to negotiate until after the economic policy is clarified. Neither continuation of our current bombing nor increased force levels and actions against the North are likely to change their mind.	<p>There is no factual basis for estimating a timetable nor of identifying the critical indecision concerning a North Vietnamese decision to negotiate. It is generally accepted in the intelligence community that there is a combination of pressure - lack of successes in SVN, increasing loss of US personnel, and deterioration of US war effort, and a combination of will force Hanoi to accept negotiations. Air/naval operations against NVN continue to be important bargaining points, because this is where the US has best control of the intensity level. A large amount of force applied in a short period of time would be more likely to induce negotiation than would gradual escalation, since that would be much more difficult to accommodate.</p>	
2 International reaction to intensified bombing of NVN	The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1000 innocents a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward country into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is one that no responsible person can accept. It could conceivably produce a costly distraction in the American national consciousness and in the world image of the United States.	<p>World reaction would generally follow the pattern already established for past expansion of air operations over NVN. These varied in policy and what they regarded as escalation of the war. Some countries had a sharp reaction; others had no reaction. Some countries did not contribute a sharp reaction, unless we were to undertake massive destruction of civilian populations. Some nations, especially the Free World nations in Asia, would privately, if not publicly, lend our actions as an indication of determination. Depending upon the intensity of the bombing campaign, there might be a move to condemn us in the UN or in some other international organization. Some nations may move to provide humanitarian assistance to NVN, save for those powers now providing it; no additional military support is likely.</p>	<p>It is estimated that the Soviets are not prepared to react to strong and direct threats or general war as a means to prevent the US from preserving its program by providing additional quantities and perhaps improved types of equipment. They could take military actions to oppose US actions to warn the US. For example, they might believe that the provision of limited numbers of volunteers, or of crews for defense equipment or possibly aircraft, would serve as a warning without leading to a serious confrontation.</p>
3 Effect of increased US determination	Increased force levels and actions against the North are likely to get us into an deeper in Southeast Asia and into a serious confrontation, if not war, with China and Russia.	<p>It is estimated that the Chinese communists would provide a major troop presence in NVN under two conditions: (1) If requested by NVN; (2) If there were a major ground invasion of NVN. (3) If the Soviet regne were in danger of collapse. Soviet or these conditions, the Chinese are expected to avoid a serious confrontation.</p>	<p>The sending or blockade of the NVN coast would be most likely to create an atmosphere of heightened tension between the US and the USSR since such action would constitute a direct challenge to the Soviets. At a minimum they would try to mobilize world opinion against the US, and, depending on the attitude of NVN, would consider taking this matter to the UN. There is little that they could do to assist NVN, since they do not have the strength in the area to force a blockade or to conduct strikes against NVN or Southeast Asia. It is considered unlikely that they would want to take the risk of preventing by such pressures a major and generalized strike operation.</p>
4 Sino/Soviet reaction to raiding Haiphong	Making the harbors would place Beijing in a particularly galling dilemma as to how to preserve the Soviet position and prestige in such a disastrous place. They might, but probably would not, force a confrontation in Southeast Asia; but they might consider doing so in Korea, Turkey, Iran, the Middle East or, most likely, Berlin. China could be expected to seize upon the harbor-raiding as the opportunity to discredit the USSR. They might read it as an indication that the US was going to apply pressure until NVN capitulated, or that there would be an eventual invasion. If so, they might decide to intervene with combat troops and air power.		<p>If Communist China read the harbor-raiding as falling under one of the conditions forth in the preceding para, they might feel compelled to take some, however, were likely they would not precipitate a confrontation solely on the basis of sailing operations.</p>

APPENDIX A

•

SPECIFIC ISSUE	DPM ADDRESSAL OF ISSUE	POSITION OF THE US/CUS OR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES	REFERENCES
"Soviet Peace Negotiators	If we should decide to shift our bombing strategy, we should inform the Soviets publicly, and the shift without fanfare; then Moscow would almost certainly know its information targets had been destroyed. It might urge Hanoi to seize this opportunity to decelerate. Without having received an ultimatum, Hanoi would be in a better posture to answer favorably.	The seriousness of Soviet arbitration of course would be determined by how they viewed their own interests at the time. It diverse US political and economic interest to the USSR; it focuses attention away from its military resources; it diminishes the military resources available for bombing and has been a divisive factor for the US, both domestically and with its allies. The bombing of RVN contributes to the war-timing approach to the war, since it is unable to protect a small ally which would force the Soviets to do more to help. On balance, the Soviets probably have more to gain by playing the role of mediator than not doing so. Since the Soviets can scarcely be considered unbiased arbiters, however, the US should use extreme caution in its reliance on this communication link with Moscow.	SRTE 11-11-67
Participation of VC accommodation of VC	"...to lay the groundwork by period: peace probes, perhaps suggesting secret talks associated with limitation of bombing and with a view to finding a compromise involving, later also, a role in the South for members of the VC."	If we are to avoid the danger of winning the war and then leading the peace in RVN, we cannot really encourage accommodation to the VC which would lead to the national life only on a rehabilitated basis. There are severe pitfalls in such direct talks with the VC, including the following: (1) This would tend to reinforce the negative image of the RVN and, conversely, grant the VC advantages the stature and prestige of the RVN. (2) It could lead to reducing the political influence of RVN, and possibly the early formation of a coalition or "Popular Front" between RVN and the aggressors. (3) It would tend to take the initiative of RVN as the aggressors. (4) It could result in a freeze in place with the aggressors left to structures from which they could continue their campaign. (5) It would create the impression of weakness and lack of resolve on the part of the US.	JCSN 792-66

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. ISAM #323, 6 April 1967, Presidential Decisions With Respect to Vietnam.
2. OX 2377-47, 26 May 1967, "Alternative Courses of Action."
3. JCSH-632-65, 23 August 1967, "Concept for Vietnam."
4. JCSH-792-66, "Incent National Security Action Memorandum on Vietnam."
5. JCSH-218-57, 20 April 1967, "Force Requirements Southeast Asia PT 1968."
6. JCSH-265-57, 18 May 1967, "Operations Against North Vietnam."
7. JCSH-266-67, 18 May 1967, "Guidelines US Military Posture."
8. DIA/CIA/DCI 68-239/A/E, "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam" (ISAM 15 Jan 67)
9. DIA/CIA/DOC 68-238-42-A, March, 1967, "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam" - January, 1967
10. SRTE 13-12-65, 10 December 1965, "Probable Communist Reaction to a US Course of Action"
11. SRTE 10-1-66, 4 February 1966, "Probable Effects of Proposed US Course of Action on RVN Capability to Support the Insurgency in South Vietnam."
12. SRTE 11-11-67, 4 May 1967, "Soviet Attitudes and Intentions Toward the Vietnam War."

APPENDIX A

A-8

94103-212

ESTRUC.

OBJECTIVES

The time has come for us to elaborate the sub-objectives from our national objectives — our combatants — in Vietnam. These principles must be articulated and actions brought to life with them. (1) Our commitment is only to see that the people of South Vietnam are permitted to determine their own future; (2) Our commitment comes if

B. 越南： We seek an independent, non-communist South Vietnam. (16 March 1958)

C. 越南 25-57: 15 military objectives that (1) make it as difficult and costly as possible for NVN to continue effective support of the VC, and to cause direction of the VC insurgency, (2) to defeat the VC and North Vietnamese armed forces in SVN and force the withdrawal of NVN forces, (3) to extend OVN domination, direction, and control over SVN, (4) to deter the Chinese communists from direct intervention in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, and to prepared to

the country comes to help itself.

such letterratio if it occurs.

The current US objectives in Vietnam, as reflected in the illustrative chronology below, are the same incorporated in that than the objectives set forth in the IPR and have consistently set the direction for our military commitment in the People's Republic of China. Implicit in those objectives is the realization of the important stakes that the United States and the People's Republic of China have in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. The objectives in the IPR, on the other hand, are narrowly circumscribed and, if anything, less clear. They could hardly set the course for our effort if they were. To start, they tend to place an unduly uncompromising emphasis on unduly uncompromising nationalistic and negative tones to our presence in SEAS.

SOURCES	COMMITTEES AS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF CONFIDENTIALITY				LEVELS OF MILITARY COMMITTEE SUPPORTED BY US MILITARY COMMISSIONERS			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOCULTURAL	CONF 1	CONF 2	CONF 3	CONF 4
1. (b) US reply to 17-nation Appeal on Vietnam - 8 April 1965 (Department of State Bulletin, 26 April 1965)	a. The Government of South Vietnam has requested the help of the United States in its defense against attack. In fulfillment of our long-standing commitments we have given such help as will continue as long as we are needed, and until the aggression is halted. In these actions we seek only the security peace of South Vietnam, and its citizens no regime.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes
	b. Peace in Southeast Asia demands an independent South Vietnam - security guaranteed and able to shape its own relationship to all others - free from outside interference -	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	no
	c. We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Vietnam.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes
2. (b) Address by President Johnson at the Commemoration of the Anniversary of the Fall of Saigon - 7 April 1965 (Department of State Bulletin 26 April 1965)	a. Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves - only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes
	b. In recent months attacks on South Vietnam were stepped up, they became necessary for us to increase our response and to maintain by air and sea a defense of our interests. It is a change in tactic that we believe that purpose requires.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes
	(1) We do this in order to allow down aggression.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes
	(2) We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam who have bravely borne this bridle battle for so many years with so many casualties.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes
	(3) and we do this to convince the leaders of North Vietnam - and all the rest to share their compact -	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes
	(a) We will not be defeated.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes
	(b) We will not grow tired.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes

* Not Applicable

B-1

Appendix B

* ४८

અંગ્રેજી B

941103-213

SOURCES	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				(Based on JCIS MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN T-21-G above)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	COUN 1	COUN 2	COUN 3	COUN 4
	(a) We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a neutrality agreement.	x	x			yes	yes	yes	yes
	(b) We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and proudest judgment that they are a necessary part of the safest road to peace.	x	x			yes	yes	yes	yes
	c. I would hope that the Secretary General of the United Nations would use the privilege of his great office and his deep knowledge of Asia to initiate, as soon as possible, with the countries of that area, a plan for cooperation in increased development.	x		x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes
	d. For our part, I will ask the Congress to join in a billion-dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope and terror with progress. The task is morally less than to enrich the hopes and existence of more than a hundred million people. And there is much to be done.	x		x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes
3. (i) Statement by President Johnson - 27 April 1965 [Department of State Bulletin, 17 May 1965]	We have not changed our essential purpose. That purpose is to resist aggression. That purpose is to avoid wider war.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
4. (ii) Message to Congress from President Johnson - 1 June 1965 (H. Doc. 156, 88th Cong., First Session)	For our part, I propose that we expand our own economic assistance to the people of South Vietnam and Laos. To propose we start now to make available our share of the money needed to harness the resources of the entire Southeast Asia region for the benefit of all its people. This must be an international venture.		x			yes	yes	yes	yes
5. (iv) Foreign Affairs Circular No. 13 entitled "The US Role in Southeast Asia," Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State - June 1965	a. The nations of Southeast Asia, as with all other Asian states, should develop as free and independent countries coexisting, to their own views and toward increasingly democratic experiences. b. The nations of the area should not threaten each other or outside nations. c. No single Asian nation should either control other nations or exercise domination either for the whole area or for any major part of it. d. The nations of the Far East should maintain and increase their ties with one another in trade and culture as a major means of uniting together a peaceful and stable world.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes
6. (v) Letter from Ambassador Goldberg to the President of the Security Council - 30 July 1965 (US Mission to the UN Press Release 4200)	a. The United States will continue to provide, in whatever measure and for whatever period is necessary, assistance to the people of the Republic of Vietnam in defending their independence, their sovereignty, and their right to choose their own government and their own destinies. b. The United States will continue to assist in the economic and social advancement of Southeast Asia, under the leadership of Asian countries and the United Nations, and will continue to explore all additional possibilities, especially in connection with the great projects taking shape in the Lower Mekong Basin.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes

941103-214

SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED BY US OFFICIALS	SUPPORT FOR JOINT MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Based on Military Objectives in JCS Pub-67 above)							
		POTENTIAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOCULTURAL	ONV 1	ONV 2	ONV 3	ONV 4
	c. The United States will continue to explore, independently and in consultation with others, all peaceful routes to a honorable and durable peace in Southeast Asia. d. The United States stands ready, as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world.	x				na	na	na	yes
						na	na	na	yes
7. (U) State Department Press Release No. 4 - 7 January 1966	Fourteen Points for Peace in Southeast Asia: (1) The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia. (2) He would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or on any part thereof. (3) He would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 nations put it. (4) He would welcome multilateral discussions as President Johnson put it. (5) A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions. (6) Hanoi's Four points could be discussed along with other points which others might wish to propose. (7) He wants no US bases in Southeast Asia. (8) We do not desire to retain US troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured. (9) We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice. (10) The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free deviation. (11) The countries of Southeast Asia can be normalized or neutral if that is their option. (12) We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars. (13) The President has said "The Viet Cong would not have difficulty in repressing and ruling their own representatives if they wanted to do so. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem." (14) We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
8. (U) State of the Union Message of President Johnson to a Joint Session of Congress - 12 January 1966	In seeking neither territory nor bases, economic domination or military alliance in Vietnam, the right for the principle of self-determination - that the people of South Vietnam should be able to choose their own course, choose it to live selections without violence, without terror, and without fear. The people of all Vietnam should make a free decision on the great question of reunification. This is all we want for South Vietnam.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

SOURCE	OBJECTIVE AS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED BY US OFFICIALS	STATE OF CONFERENCE			SUPPOSED TO BE MILITARY OBJECTIVES (Tied to Military Objectives in Item 2B-G above)							
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIAL/CULT.	NO	10	2	ONLY	10	2	ONLY
	b. We have also made it clear - from Mao to New York - that there are no arbitrary limits to our search for peace. We will not be bound by the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962. We will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals - 10 points or 100 - and we will consider the views of any group. We will work for a cease-fire now or once discussions have begun. We will respond if others reduce their use of force, and we will withdraw our soldiers once South Vietnam is securely guaranteed the right to shape its own future.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	c. And let me be absolutely clear: the days may become harder and the months may become years, but we will stay as long as desperation commands us to battle.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
9. (U) Essohain Declaration 6 Feb 1966	a. To prohibit independent VC role in future negotiations. b. To induce maximum active international support for SVA war effort. c. To achieve a peaceful settlement as soon as possible. d. To support self-determination by free popular elections. e. To prevent aggression. f. To develop and expand handicraft and light industry. g. To expand rural electrification program. h. To prevent infiltration. i. To achieve a social revolution through rural construction. j. To demonstrate humanitarianism through refugee relief.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
10. (U) Statement by Secretary Rusk on Paris-Gen Relations - 10 February 1966 (Department of State Publication 1054)	a. We are in Vietnam because the largest need there is an adequately understood wish for our own safety and security that the outcome of the struggle can peacefully affect the welfare of the world in which we and our children will live. b. What we are seeking to achieve in South Vietnam is part of a process that has continued for a long time - a process of preventing the expansion and extension of communist domination by the use of force against the weaker nations on the periphery of communist power. c. In South Vietnam we want to bring about a restoration of the conditions existing before the coup of 30 April 1975. We do not want to restore the authority of the establishment under the French Government and the communist forces under the CPV. We want a settlement from a part of the structure of arrangements that are the key to stability in the present-day world.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
11. (U) Public Testimony by Secretary Rusk before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations - 20 April 1966 JCS 10 15389	Our objective is not to destroy the communist government of North Vietnam. Our objective is to defend ourselves. Our objective is to defend our allies. Our objective is to defend our friends. Our objective is to defend our relatives. Our objective is to defend our compatriots. Our objective is to defend our relationship with South Vietnam. Our objective is to defend our friends. Our objective is to defend our relatives. Our objective is to defend our compatriots. Our objective is to defend our countrymen. It is not even to work toward a time when South Vietnam will be part of a military alliance in which the United States is a member. It is far more limited than any of those things. It is only to preserve for the Vietnamese people the right and the opportunity to shape their own destiny, to determine the form of their political institutions, to determine the form of their economic system, and in effect to run their own affairs. It is very limited in scope. It is limited to its objectives, and our military operations are limited to its objectives. And to conduct those more than is true of both our long-term and short-term military operations.	x	x	x	x	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

SOURCE	CRITERIA AS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED BY US OFFICIALS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOCULTURAL	ONU 1	ONU 2	ONU 3	ONU 4
Essential Points of US Policy:									
12. (C) State Circular Relating to all Diplomatic Posts (State 20504-7500) - 5 August 1966	(1) The United States is absolutely determined to continue its support of South Vietnam's resistance to communism by aggression, and will withdraw from this position unless the aggression ends and South Vietnam is able to determine its own future free of outside control. (2) The US bombing of North Vietnam is restricted to military targets which are being used by North to support the aggression against South Vietnam. The United States remains prepared to cease this bombing provided South takes reciprocal action. (3) The United States continues to offer far unmet additional assistance, economic and otherwise, to help the Free Republic of South Vietnam. This includes assistance in the form of supplies and funds for reconstruction and rehabilitation of the essentials of the 1969 and 1972 Defense Accords. (4) The United States does not threaten the existence of the regime of North Vietnam. It holds no animosity toward the people of North Vietnam, and indeed the President has held out to their government the prospect of cooperation in economic development when peace has been restored. (5) The United States does not have to initiate bases in South Vietnam, and we have repeatedly pledged to withdraw troops from South Vietnam when its security and freedom of choice is assured. (6) The United States does not oppose the reunification of Vietnam. We support the right of self-determination through the free choice of the Vietnamese people. Likewise, the United States does not oppose the neutrality or non-alignment of all the countries of Southeast Asia if that is their desire.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	(7) Our policy is stated; the United States seeks only to stop communist aggression; it is not attacking communists specifically. We are in Vietnam to demonstrate the impracticality of aggression and to persuade the aggressor to seek peace in his own interests. We have come to the aid of South Vietnam, at its request and under the right of collective self-defense, in the face of a prolonged aggression of a totalitarian and totalitarian character. Our military objectives are to defend the Free Republic of South Vietnam, to support its neighbors, to assist them in their defense, to prevent the North from taking its place alone. The smaller nations throughout the world have a critical stake in this principle, and in the effort to maintain the integrity of South Vietnam.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	US military objectives are threefold: a. To seek out and destroy the main units of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. b. To undercut the infiltration of men and material from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. c. To provide a screen of security behind which the revolutionary development of South Vietnam can take place.	X	X	X	X	Yes***	Yes	Yes	Yes
13. (C) Briefing by Secretary McNamara to the Cabinet - 25 August 1966	US military objectives include: a. To seek out and destroy the main units of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. b. To undercut the infiltration of men and material from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. c. To provide a screen of security behind which the revolutionary development of South Vietnam can take place.	X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

- * JCS objective includes a task to detect, locate, and destroy the movement of forces in SWA rather than the Secher Task and destroy, which together with the USG objective to force the withdrawal of RVN forces, is an apparent difference from the Secher objective. Secher objective does not include forcing the withdrawal of RVN forces.
- + US objective supports the Secher objective but goes beyond it with tasks that indicate the movement of material into RVN and indicates that the USG objective is to force the withdrawal of RVN forces. The USG objective is to force the withdrawal of RVN forces on the more limited task of impeding the flow of men and material from RVN into SWA.
- ** US objective could be interpreted to mean that US forces have the prime responsibility for extending OVN control. However, the implementing tasks clearly indicate that the US forces assist the OVN in the R/D mission. Secher objective limits the US force objective to providing security so that the OVN may accomplish R/D.
- *** The article objectives have no parallel for JCS Objective 4.

Appendix B

SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PREDICTED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				(PREDICTED BY US MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN JCS-21B, if above)		
		MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	ON 1	ON 2	ON 3	ON 4
14. (U) Statement by Secretary McNamara to the Press in Saigon - 14 October 1966	The United States is not fighting to overthrow the communist regime in North Vietnam, nor is it attempting to destroy its economy. But the sole objective of all other South Vietnamese to show their own political darling.	x	x	x	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
15. (U) Manila Conference 25 Oct 1966	a. To restore peace in SVN and the rest of Asia. b. To preserve the territorial integrity of SVN. c. To reunify Vietnam by free choice of all Vietnamese. d. To reconcile all elements of Vietnamese society. e. To withdraw all foreign forces as SVN military and paramilitary forces are withdrawn, infiltration ceases and level of violence subsides. f. To achieve end of hostilities settlement which includes effective guarantees against further aggression. g. To force SVN to abandon aggression. h. To modernize agriculture. i. To achieve distributive land reform and tenancy system. j. To achieve economic prosperity through regional development. k. To overcome poverty, disease, illiteracy, social injustice. l. To create a SVN civil government based on honesty and justice.	x	x	x	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
16. (U) State of the Union Message of President Johnson to Joint Session of Congress - 25 January 1967	a. We are in Vietnam because the United States and our allies are committed by the SEATO Treaty to "act to meet the common dangers" of aggression in Southeast Asia. b. We are in Vietnam because an international agreement signed by the United States, North Vietnam and others in 1962 is being systematically violated by the communists. That violation threatens the independence of all the small nations in Southeast Asia and the peace of the entire region. c. We are there because the people of South Vietnam have a right to remain non-communist - if that is what they choose - as North Vietnam has to remain communist.	x	x	x	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
17. (U) Statement of Secretary McNamara before the House Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1968-72 Defense Program and 1968 Defense Budget.	a. At the President's direction, the policies and objectives of the United States Government with regard to the conflict in Vietnam had been stated by Ambassador Goldberg at the United Nations last September. Among the points he made were the following: (1) Ours is a strictly limited aim. (2) We are not engaged in a "Holy War" against communism. (3) We do not seek to establish an American empire or a "sphere of influence" in Asia.	x	x	x	x	Yes*	MA	MA

Appendix B

B-6

94103-218

SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PRONONCED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY US MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN JCS 21-67 ABOVE)			
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOLOGICAL	ON 1	ON 2	ON 3	ON 4
(1) We seek no military bases, no permanent establishment of troops, no permanent American "presence" of any kind in South Vietnam.		X				NA	NA	Yes*	NA
(2) We do not seek the overthrow of the Government of North Vietnam.		X	X			Yes**	NA	NA	NA
(3) We do not seek to threaten any legitimate interest of the people of China.		X	X			NA	NA	NA	NA
(4) We do not seek to threaten any legitimate interest of the people of Laos.		X	X	X	X	Yes#	NA	Yes***	NA
b. Let me say affirmatively and succinctly what our aims are.						Yes###	Bo	Bo	Yes
(1) We want a political solution, not a military solution, to this conflict. Similarly, we reject the idea that North Vietnam has a right to impose a military solution.		X	X			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
(2) We seek to assure the people of South Vietnam the same right of self-determination -- to decide their own political destiny, free of force -- that the United Nations Charter affirms for all.		X				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
(3) And we believe that reunification of Vietnam should be decided upon through a free choice by the peoples of both the North and South without outside interference, the results of which choice we are fully prepared to support.		X				Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
18. (S) Statement of Secretary McNamara before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations - Fiscal Year 1967 Supplemental for Southeast Asia - 22 January 1967									
a. Our over-all policy objective in South Vietnam is a stable and independent government free of external control and externally inspired and supported violence.		X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
b. Our immediate objective is to influence the North Vietnamese to move the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table, or to compel them to desist in their aggression. The basic tasks which flow from these objectives are:		X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
(1) To support the re-establishment of the authority of the Government of South Vietnam over its territory.		X	X	X	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
(2) To interdict the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.		X	X	X	X	Yes	NA	NA	NA
(3) To exert pressure on the Government of North Vietnam to cease its direction and support of the insurrection in South Vietnam.		X	X	X	X	Yes	NA	NA	NA

Appendix B

B-7

- * The JCS objective could be interpreted to mean that US forces have prime responsibility for extending GVN control. However, the implementation tasks indicate US forces assist the GVN in N.D.
- The SecDef objective emphasizes the US support role.
- ** The SecDef objectives do not include a parallel for JCS Objective 4, although they undoubtedly receive consideration.

94-03-219

SOURCES	CONFIDENTIAL AS PUBLISHED IN OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE				SUPPORTED BY JCS MILITARY OBJECTIVES			
		JOINTCOM	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOCULTURAL	ONR 1	ONR 2	ONR 3	ONR 4
Department of Defense News Release 16-27 - 28 February 1967	<p>a. The communists open up a new front by proposing that war material sent South to help the people of South Vietnam fight the United States fighting men and their families should be served primarily in the quantities dictated by North Vietnam. In the manner chosen by North Vietnamese and over infiltration routes most advantageous to North Vietnamese, Hanoi provides nothing in the position put forward by Mai Van Bo to Paris. It demands such a permanent cessation of United States bombing.</p> <p>b. The United States will continue to make North Vietnam pay a price for its repression. This country will not stop the bombing unless it can get the lives of those who resist the aggression unbroken. It is ordered in return, it will stop the bombing in return for a complete de-escalation of military action by the March Weathermen.</p> <p>c. None of these is our objective. Our objective is limited to securing for the people of South Vietnam the right to change their own destiny. Their right to change their own destiny is the fundamental condition which we must do without the threat, the pressure from external sources.</p> <p>d. Now, since that is a limited objective, we should seek to accomplish it at the lowest possible cost to this nation, in the lowest cost in terms of dollars, but the lowest cost in terms of lives. All we want, of course, is that we should take steps to end the conflict, to achieve a negotiated peace, to reduce the risk of increasing the conflict and the human suffering, and the cost to us in terms of American lives. And that is the foundation of our bombing policy.</p> <p>e. Now since that is our objective, we sought to accomplish three things by the bombing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) To raise the morale of the South Vietnamese. (2) To either reduce the level of infiltration of men and equipment from North to South or to increase the cost of that infiltration. (3) To make clear to the political leaders of the North that they will pay a price so long as they continue to carry on in their aggression of the South. 	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
20. (U) Address by Ambassador Goldberg to the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, Tokyo - 26 February 1967	<p>a. The United States will negotiate on Vietnam only with the objective of ending the war and not merely to de-escalate.</p> <p>b. The United States sincerely seeks a political settlement rather than unconditional surrender, although it is not interested in negotiations with less than a full settlement in mind.</p>	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
21. (U) News Conference by Secretary of Defense in Washington, D. C. - 26 February 1967	<p>a. We have a very limited objective in Southeast Asia today - namely, to end the war, to arrest existing to destroy existing bases from which we can carry out our objectives. We are not even seeking to establish relationships with South Vietnam in terms of which they will be our military allies in terms of which they will provide for us permanent military bases on the land mass of Southeast Asia.</p>	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
22. (U) News Conference by President Johnson in Washington, D. C. - 27 February 1967	<p>Our principal objective in North Vietnam is to provide the maximum deterrent to people who believe aggression pays, with a minimum cost to us and to them.</p> <p>(1) Address by President Johnson to the House Select Committee - 15 March 1967</p>	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
	<p>a. Three basic US objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) An honorable peace that will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror or intimidation from the North. (2) A Southeast Asia in which all countries - including the real North Vietnam - apply their scarce resources to the welfare of their people; combating hunger, ignorance, and disease. (3) A concrete demonstration that aggression across international frontiers or domination like is no longer an acceptable means of political change. 	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

SOURCE	OBJECTIVES AS PUBLICLY PRORESSED BY US OFFICIALS	SCOPE OF OBJECTIVE						SUPPORTED IN JCS MILITARY OPERATIONS (Formed to Military Objective in JCS 2-6-67 Annex)		
		POLITICAL	MILITARY	ECONOMIC	SOCIOCULTURAL	ON 1	ON 2	ON 3	ON 4	ON 5
	b. Three purposes in selective bombing of military targets									
In North Vietnam:										
a. To break our fighting men by destroying the enemy's sanctuaries.	(1) To exact a penalty against North Vietnam for her flagrant violations of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	yes
	(2) To exact a penalty against North Vietnam for her flagrant violations of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	yes
	(3) To limit the flow, or to substantially increase the cost of infiltration of men and material from North Vietnam.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	yes
2b. (u) OASIS Communiqué - 21 March 1967	Defend freedom in South Vietnam and at the same time continue the earnest search for an honorable peace.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	yes
25. (u) Statement to the Press by President Johnson in Washington, D. C., upon his return from the Geneva Conference (20-21 March 1967) - 22 March 1967	We shall persevere in our efforts to find an honorable peace. Until that is achieved, we shall of course continue to do our duty in Vietnam.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	yes

B-9